The specificity of the scientific field and the social conditions of the progress of reason * &dquo;The training of the scientific mind is not only a reform of ordinary knowledge, but also a conversion of interests.&dquo; Gaston Bachelard, Le rationalisme appliqué.
1. As a system of objective relations between positions already won (in previous struggles), the scientific field is the locus of a competitive struggle, in which the specific issue at stake is the monopoly of scientific authority, defined inseparably as technical capacity and social power, or, to put it another way, the monopoly of scientific competence, in the sense of a particular agent's socially recognised capacity to speak and act legitimately (i.e. in an autho rised and authoritative way) in scientific matters.
Two rapid observations, to dispel possible misunderstandings: First, care must be taken not to reduce the objective relations which constitute the field to the aggregate of the interactions, in the interactionist sense, i.e. the strategies -which it in fact determines, as will be seen below 1. Secondly, it will be necessary to define &dquo;socially recognised&dquo;: it will be seen that the group which grants this recognition always tends to be progressively narrowed to the group of scientists, i.e. competitors, as accumulated scientific resources, and correlatively the autonomy of the field, increase.
When we say that the field is the locus of struggles, we are not simply breaking away from the irenic image of the &dquo;scientific community&dquo;, as described by scientific hagiography -and often, subsequently, by the sociology of science -i.e. the notion of a sort of &dquo;kingdom of ends&dquo; knowing no other laws than that of the perfect competition of ideas, a contest infallibly decided by the intrinsic strength of the true idea. We are also insisting that the ope-ration of the scientific field itself produces and presupposes a specific form of interest (scientific practices appearing as &dquo;disinterested&dquo; only in relation to different interests, produced and demanded by other fields).
References to scientific interest and scientific authority ( This is well put by a physicist in a thoroughly remarkable article which contrasts in its clarity and lucidity with the bulk of the sociological literature devoted to science: &dquo;While still in high school, the scientist-to-be becomes aware that competition and prestige will affect his future success. He must strive for good grades in order to be admitted to college and later to graduate school. He realizes the importance of attending a college of high reputation not only because it will provide him with a better education but also because it will facilitate his later admissior: to a good graduate school&dquo;. 3 In setting the testimony of a physicist above the works of the sociologists of science, I am conscious of committing what will appear to many an act of sacrilege, a profanation so outrageous that -but for this express statement, and even perhaps despite it -it could only be attributed to ignorance (ignorance of the fact that Fred Reif &dquo;is a mere physicist&dquo;, or ignorance of the &dquo;right&dquo; authors) and would in itself be sufhcient to disqualify its perpetrator. All the more so because it is accompanied by a whole series of transgressions which are no less deliberate but are likely to be interpreted within the same logic of hostile prejudice (a situation which has the virtue of exposing one of the functions of quotation, one which is haughtily neglected by the quotologists, that of ingratiation by the multiplication of signs of recognition intended to elicit recognition). Only the lacunae of &dquo;lack of education&dquo; could explain the presence of authors who are barely recognised (Kuhn himself...), marginal (Glaser, Feuer, etc.) or unknown (the Europeans, for instance, whom the official science of science loftily ignores), or, worse still, the absence of the canonical authors of that same Official science who, moreover, fail to receive recognition (measurable by the number of quotations or the length of passages analysing or even taking issue with them) proportional to their place in the hierarchical order 4. The social strength of false science lies partly in the fact that it attracts to its reasons a challenge which should be directed at its causes, and those who read to the end of this text will perhaps understand why energy which can be better employed elsewhere has not been expended on arguing with false science (having to read it is quite enough). It is moreover only to be expected that authors who themselves presume to give an account of science without referring to the educational system and the work done on it should find it perfectly incongruous to make reference to the educational system, haute couture and art. And what will be said of the barbarism of taking the disciples, who at least put their concepts to the test of the facts, more seriously -in a text which bears all the outward signs of &dquo;theoretical writing&dquo; -than the master who has produced them? By the tribute it has to pay to science, false science lends itself at least to scientific criticism, and it is sometimes possible to take from it facts that it has produced and to set them in a quite different system of relations.
Because all scientific practices are directed towards the acquisition of scientific authority (prestige, recognition, fame, etc.), intrinsically two-fold stakes, what is generally called &dquo;interest&dquo; in a particular scientific activity (a discipline, a branch of that discipline, a method) is always two-sided; and so are the strategies tending to bring about the satisfaction of that interest.
An analysis which tried to isolate a purely &dquo;political&dquo; dimension in struggles for domination of the scientific field would be as radically wrong as the (more frequent) opposite course of only attending to the &dquo;pure&dquo;, purely intellectual, determinations involved in scientific controversies. For example, the present-day struggle between different specialists for research grants and facilities can never be reduced to a simple struggle for strictly &dquo;political&dquo; This raises the question of the degree of social arbitrariness of the belief which is produced by the functioning of the field and is the condition of its functioning, or, -and this amounts to the same thing -the question of the field's degree of autonomy (in relation, first, to the social demands of the dominant class and the internal and external social conditions of that autonomy). The principle of all the differences between, on one side, scientific fields capable of producing and satisfying a strictly scientific interest and thus maintaining an unending dialectical process, and, on the other side, learned fields in which collective labour has no other effect or function than to perpetuate a field identical to itself, by producing, both within the field and outside it, belief in the autonomous value of the objectives and objects which it produces, lies in the relationship of dependence in the guise of independence which false science maintains with external demands: the doxosophers, the professors of false science, learned in appearance and learned in appearances, cannot legitimate either the dispossession that they effect by the arbitrary constitution of an esoteric learning inaccessible to the laity, or the delegation that they demand by arrogating to themselves the monopoly of certain practices or of reflexion on those practices, unless they can impose the belief that their false science is perfectly independent of the social demands which it could not satisfy so perfectly if it ceased to proclaim so loudly that it refuses to serve them.
From Heidegger speaking of the masses and the elites in the highly euphemised language of the &dquo;authentic&dquo; and the &dquo;inauthentic&dquo;, to the American political scientists who reproduce the official vision of the social world in the semi-abstractions of a descriptive-normative discourse, one always encounters the same strategy of false separation which defines learned jargon as opposed to scientific language. Where 38. All the processes accompanying the autonomisation of the scientific field are in dialectical relationship: thus the constant raising of the cost of entry implied in accumulation of the specific resources contributes in return to the autonomisation of the scientific field by setting up a social separation from the profane world of laymen, a separation made all the more radical by the fact that it is not sought for its own sake.
39. The habitus produced by class upbringing in the earliest years of life and the secondary habituts inculcated by schooling play a part (of differing importance in the case of the social sciences and that of the natural sciences) in determining a pre-reflexive adherence to the
